



UNCLASSIFIED



Operation TOGETHER FORWARD

BCT Employment Options

Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence

Senior Plans Meeting
29 Jan 07

Problem: How do we *secure the population of Baghdad* while helping the *GOI transition* to security self-reliance?



Overall Classification for this Brief is ~~SECRET//REL to USA, MCF//MR~~

As of 26 March 2007
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Good morning, sir. Last week you sent us back to refine the operational and threat conditions, the decision points and assumptions associated with the deployment of three BCTs to Iraq. This brief is in response to guidance received during the previous SPM.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR~~



Purpose and Agenda

Purpose: Provide the Commander operational and threat conditions for employment of 5 additional BCTs



Agenda:

- Received Guidance
- Refined Threat SITEMP
- New Operational Conditions
- Commander's Mission and Intent
- Current Friendly Set
- Refined FFIR
- Decision Points, Unit Capabilities, Deployment Timeline and Employment Options
- Comments and Guidance

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~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR~~

Sir, this is our purpose and the agenda we will follow.



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP~~

Received Guidance

(Senior Plans Meeting)



- The first two BCTs go to Baghdad
- Lay out the options for remaining three BCTs by
 - Refining Decision Points
 - Reflecting assumptions and
 - Defining conditions that exist for the commitment of additional BCTs
- Clean up the tasks—five key tasks:
 - Assist the ISF in securing the population of Baghdad
 - Exploit and reinforce success in Anbar
 - Disrupt the Sunni/Shia extremists in southern Diyala
 - **Assist the ISF in** securing the population of Baqubah
 - Reduce the accelerants of sectarian violence
- Where [and how] will the two Marine Battalions be employed? (U)
- What if Shia extremists conduct operations in Center-South and / or Southeast?
- Provide more detail on PRT organization, provincial considerations, continuity of threat and unity of effort
- What will the Iraqis accept? PM SoE Directive (U)

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP~~

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Sir, this is our understanding of guidance we received from you last week. PAUSE Sir, the blue text is my addition. I would like to confirm my interpretation of task four. On the subsequent slide I will lay out the guidance I heard at the Intelligence Fusion brief last week.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR~~



Received Guidance

(Intel Fusion Brief)

- To secure Baghdad we have to secure the Support Zones
- I need a slide that shows threat strength in the Baghdad support zones overlaid with CF boundaries down to Battalion level
- I need a map with tribes overlaid on it

4


~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR~~

Sir, these are our take aways from the Intelligence Fusion briefing based on your guidance. Sir, what we would like to do now is frame the threat environment. I will be followed by (b)(3), (b)(6)

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:

1.4c

Approved for Release





Sir, what I am going to do now is walk you through the employment options. I will first review each of your decisions associated with the appropriate BCT. Then I will lay out the timeline associated with each BCTs movement of equipment and personal and the recommended latest time you can decide where you want to employ them. This will be accompanied by, for your information, BCT capabilities. Finally, using the map you see now walk around the potential areas of employment and lay out the conditions for employment.



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP~~

IBCT Capability and Deployment Timeline



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP~~

Sir, 4/1 ID has requested 535 Up-armored HMMWVs, however we expect they will only be filled to approximately 400. This represents

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Confirmation
Decision Point 9a
(3/3 ID)

Decision: Request BCT #18 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

Desired Effects:
1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure
3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized

3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops
4A: IED Network Neutralized

SIR	FFIR
1. What is the state of the AQI threat in Al Anbar Province?	1. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad security belt ?
2. What is the current level of violence in Baghdad/Baqubah?	2. Do we have enough forces to interdict/neutralize T&FFs along the TRV and ERV?
3. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/ Baqubah?	3. Do we have enough forces to Clear, Control, and Retain Baghdad's nine Security Framework Districts ?
4. What is the level of violence in Baghdad?	4. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad?
5. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?	5. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?
6. What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad?	6. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Support Zones ?
7. How effective are AQI insurgents in Baghdad's Support Zones?	7. Do we have enough forces to oversee SiBs and / or protect key infrastructure?
8. What is the current level of violence in Sadr City?	
9. What is the status of key infrastructure?	

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As of: 1/14/2007 10:30 PM

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP~~

Sir, your decision point for 3/3 ID.




~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MA~~

HBCT Capability




What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?




1.4a, 1.4g

Sir, at the bottom of the slide is the refined deployment timeline associated with 3/3ID. Above the timeline and for your information are the capabilities the HBCT brings. We anticipate 3/3ID will draw APS-5 and receive as many as 400 UAHs. Moving to the timeline at the bottom of the chart. The star indicates our assessment of the latest time we recommend you can change the BCTs assignment.



Sir, on 31 Mar an HBCT will be available for deployment into the area of operations. The differences from the 4/1 ID is this chart will not only provide threat and operational conditions, but recommended task and purpose associated with the BCT for each of the areas displayed on the previous chart similar to this one. Sir, in a dark blue color I have highlighted the new operational conditions and this will remain the same throughout the remaining two charts like this one. As before let me begin with Baghdad. You will notice at the bottom of the conditions box the two events we believe will be different at the time you have to decide where to employ this Brigade.




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Confirmation

Decision Point 9b

(4/2 SBCT)



Decision: Request BCT #19 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad	
Desired Effects: 1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure 3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized	
3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops 4A: IED Network Neutralized	
SIR 1. What is the current state of the AQI threat in Al Anbar? 2. What is the current level of violence in the 9+1 key cities? 3. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/Baqubah? 4. What is the status of militias in Baghdad / Baqubah? 5. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces? 6. What is the current status of the nine Security Framework Districts of Baghdad? 7. How effective are AQI insurgents in the Baghdad Security Belt? 8. What is the level of violence in Sadr City? 9. What is the status of key infrastructure?	FFIR 1. Do the Iraqi Security Forces have enough combat power to continue Clear/ Control/ Retain operations in Baghdad? 2. Do we have enough forces to prevent the spread of violence in the 9+1 key cities? 3. <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; text-align: center;">1.4b, 1.4d</div> 4. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad? 5. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs? 6. Do we have enough forces to secure Al-Anbar? 7. Do we have enough forces to secure the Support Zones ? 8. Do we have enough force committed to the Operational Reserve to retain flexibility? 9. Do we have enough forces to oversee SIBs and, or protect key infrastructure?

As of: 1/14/2007 10:30 PM ~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR~~

Sir, this is your decision point for 4/2 SBCT.



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFWMA~~

SBCT Capabilities



What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?




And sir, here are the capabilities of the BCT for your information. 4/2 SBCT due to its Strykers will only require 120 UAHs largely for its sustainment element. That said, I would draw your attention to the timeline at the bottom of the chart and the star which indicates what we believe to be the latest possible time you could decide where to employ the BCT.




~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFWMR~~

HBCT Capability

What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?



Sir, there are no sustentative changes to the BCT organization that we are aware of. As opposed to 535 HMMWVs that should read 390-400. Sir, I direct your attention to the timeline at the bottom of the chart and the



And finally, sir on 31 May you will have the final BCT of the five additional available for employment. (b)(3), (b)(6) is prepared to provide the threat conditions as required.

What I would like to do now is lay out the timelines of employment side-by-side.

